Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Chamber of Commerce by United States Chamber of Commerce
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation Research Projects and Empirical Data
1-1-2011
Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Chamber of
Commerce
United States Chamber of Commerce
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
United States Chamber of Commerce, "Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Chamber of Commerce" (2011). Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 137.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/137
 Nos. 11-11021-HH, 11-11067-HH  
 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
___________________________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through Pam Bondi Attorney General,  
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, by and through Alan Wilson Attorney General, 
et al.,  
 
 Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, et al.,  
 
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 
___________________________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
___________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS 
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY 
___________________________ 
 
ROBIN S. CONRAD 
SHANE B. KAWKA 
National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc. 
1615 H Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20062 
(202) 463-5337 
K. LEE BLALACK, II 
   Counsel of Record 
BRIAN BOYLE 
JOSHUA DEAHL 
O’Melveny & Myers LLP 
1625 Eye Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
(202) 383-5300 
 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
 
State of Florida, et al. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., et al. 
Nos. 11-11021-HH, 11-11067-HH 
 
  C-1 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS 
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, undersigned counsel certifies that amicus 
is not a publicly held corporation and that no corporation or other publicly held 
entity owns more than 10% of its stock.  Pursuant to 11th Circuit Rule 26.1-1, 
undersigned counsel for amicus certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, the list 
of persons or entities that have or may have an interest in the outcome of this case 
is adequately set forth in the Appellants’ opening brief and the subsequently filed 
briefs of the other amici in this case, except for the following additions:  
Amicus Curiae 
 
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America  
 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
 
Blalack, K. Lee II 
 
Boyle, Brian 
 
Conrad, Robin S. 
 
Deahl, Joshua 
 
Kawka, Shane B. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers LLP 
 
/s/ Joshua Deahl    
Joshua Deahl 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
 i
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS....................................................C-1 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .....................................................C-1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE........................................................................1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT........................................2 
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................8 
I. IF THE MINIMUM COVERAGE MANDATE IS HELD TO EXCEED 
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, HEALTH INSURANCE 
REFORM PROVISIONS IN THE PPACA SHOULD ALSO BE 
INVALIDATED AS NON-SEVERABLE FROM THE MANDATE ...........8 
A. Applying Severability Analysis to the PPACA ....................................8 
B. A Proper Approach to Severability Compels the Conclusion that 
the PPACA’s Guaranteed-Issue and Community-Rating Provisions 
Are Non-Severable from the Individual Mandate...............................12 
C. Health Insurance Reforms Beyond the Guaranteed-Issue and 
Community-Rating Provisions Are Similarly Intertwined With the 
Individual Mandate for Severability Purposes....................................17 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
 ii
1. The PPACA’s risk-adjustment provision .................................17 
2. The PPACA’s bar on annual limits for benefits .......................19 
3. The PPACA’s Medical Loss Ratio provision...........................21 
II. IF THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE INVALIDATION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE BUT DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 
ENTIRE ACT, IT SHOULD REMAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
CONDUCT A PROPER SEVERABILITY ANALYSIS IN THE FIRST 
INSTANCE....................................................................................................26 
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................29 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
 
 iii
Cases 
Ackerley Commc’ns of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge,  
135 F.3d 210 (1st Cir. 1998)...............................................................................27 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,  
480 U.S. 678 (1987)................................................................................... 8, 9, 12 
Am. Banker’s Ass’n v. Gould,  
412 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................27 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,  
298 U.S. 238 (1936)............................................................................................16 
Chesapeake B&M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md.,  
58 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1995) ..............................................................................27 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,  
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010)..........................................................................................8 
Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach,  
574 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................27 
Virginia v. Sebelius,  
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) ............................................................ 9, 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
 
 iv
Vt. Right of Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,  
211 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000) ...............................................................................27 
Statutes 
26 U.S.C. § 4001......................................................................................................26 
26 U.S.C. § 5000A........................................................................................... passim 
42 U.S.C. § 18031....................................................................................................26 
42 U.S.C. § 18063................................................................................... 6, 17, 18, 19 
42 U.S.C. § 18091............................................................................................ passim 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg....................................................................................... 10, 13, 28 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5.................................................................................................13 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6.................................................................................................13 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-7.................................................................................................13 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
 
 v
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 ..............................................................................................19 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 ....................................................................................... 21, 23 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94 ..............................................................................................26 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-060 (1994) .............................................................15 
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 2736-C...........................................................................15 
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 420-G:6........................................................................................15 
N.J. Stat. § 17B:27A-22...........................................................................................15 
N.Y. Ins. L. §§ 3231, 3232 ......................................................................................15 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 4080B ...................................................................................15 
Wash. Code § 48.43.012 ..........................................................................................15 
Rules 
Fed. R. App. P. 25......................................................................................................1 
Fed. R. App. P. 29....................................................................................................12 
Interim Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,188 (June 28, 2010) .......................................19 
Legislative History 
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 255 (as passed by House, Nov. 7, 2009) .........................9 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
 
 vi
Hearing of the Oversight & Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Energy & 
Commerce Comm. (Feb. 16, 2011).....................................................................20 
 Making Health Care Work for American Families: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th 
Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 2009) ...................................................................................14 
Other Authorities 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Medical Loss Ratio ........................................24 
General Accounting Office, Health Care Reform: Considerations for 
Risk Adjustment under Community Rating, GAO/HEHS 94-173 ......................18 
Jonathan Gruber, Center for American Progress, Why We Need the 
Individual Mandate, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2010).............................................................15 
Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law,  
25 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 71, 97 (2000)........................................................15 
Bradley Herring, An Economic Perspective on the Individual 
Mandate’s Severability from the PPACA,  
364 New Eng. J. Med. 16e (Mar. 10, 2011) .................................................14, 25 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
 
 vii
Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market 
Reform in Washington, Kentucky and Massachusetts,  
25 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 133 (2000)............................................................16 
Robert Kuttner, The Risk-Adjustment Debate,  
339 New Eng. J. Med. 1952 (Dec. 24, 1998) ...............................................17, 18 
Anthony T. Lasso, National Institute for Health Care Management 
Foundation, Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue in the 
Individual Health Insurance Market (Jan. 2011) ...............................................15 
Letter from Roger A. Sevigny, N.H. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen 
Sebelius, (Jan. 6, 2011).......................................................................................24 
Letter from Sharon P. Clark, Ky. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen 
Sebelius (Feb. 16, 2011) .....................................................................................24 
Letter from Steven B. Larsen to Mila Kofman, Me. Superintendent of 
Ins. (Mar. 8, 2011) ........................................................................................24, 25 
Roberta B. Meyer, Justification for Permitting Life Insurers to 
Continue to Underwrite on the Basis of Genetic Information and 
Genetic Test Results, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1271 (1993) ..................................15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
 
 viii
President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care 
(Sept. 9, 2009).......................................................................................................2 
Robert Pear, Four States Get Waivers to Carry Out Health Law, N.Y. Times,  
 Feb. 17, 2011.......................................................................................................21 
Scoreboard, Politico, Apr. 1, 2011 ..........................................................................24 
 
  1
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 
 The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) 
is the world’s largest business federation, representing 300,000 direct members and 
indirectly representing an underlying membership of three million businesses and 
professional organizations of every size, in every industry sector, and from every region 
of the country.  At least 98 percent of the Chamber’s members are small businesses 
with one hundred or fewer employees.  The Chamber advocates on issues of vital 
concern to the nation’s business community and has frequently participated as 
amicus curiae before this Court and other courts.  The provision of health 
insurance is of considerable interest to Chamber members, since many of them are 
employers who provide health insurance to their employees.  Indeed, employers 
are the country’s largest providers of health insurance, providing coverage for more 
than 160 million people and more than 60 percent of nonelderly Americans.  
                                                 
1  The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  Fed. R. App. P. 
25(a).  No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no such 
counsel or any party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief.  Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5)(A)–(B).  No 
person or entity—other than amicus, its members, or its counsel—made a 
monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation or submission.  Fed. 
R. App. P. 29(c)(5)(C). 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or the Act) 
contains an extensive set of reforms primarily intended to make health insurance 
available to and affordable for millions of uninsured Americans and increase the 
quality of health insurance for all Americans.  See President Barack Obama, 
Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-the-president-to-a-
joint-session-of-congress-on-health-care (“[I]f you’re one of the tens of millions of 
Americans who don’t currently have health insurance … this plan will finally offer 
you quality, affordable choices.”).  The Act’s insurance reforms are interdependent 
and built upon one central provision:  the minimum coverage mandate in Section 
1501.  PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501(a), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).   
 The individual mandate is central to the health insurance reforms because 
Congress understood that it could not simply prohibit insurers from denying 
coverage or increasing the costs of coverage to the unhealthiest subscribers.  
Standing alone, those restrictions (the core of which is known as the guaranteed-
issue and community-rating reforms) would make health insurance less affordable 
because individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they absolutely 
needed it, forcing insurers to raise premiums for everyone else.  To prevent this, 
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Congress’s solution was to include a minimum coverage requirement in the 
PPACA—the so-called individual mandate.   
 By requiring individuals to maintain a minimum level of health insurance 
coverage, the individual mandate prevents the type of adverse selection that would 
otherwise undermine the PPACA’s insurance market reforms.  The individual 
mandate makes it possible for the guaranteed-issue, community-rating, and other 
insurance reforms to function as Congress intended.  As Congress explained, the 
individual mandate “is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in 
which improved health insurance products that … do not exclude coverage of 
preexisting conditions can be sold.”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).   
 This Court has received substantial briefing on the question of whether the 
individual mandate represents a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional powers.  
Amicus does not address this issue and takes no position on the constitutionality of 
the individual mandate, but instead submits this brief to address a secondary 
question—viz., if the individual mandate were held to exceed Congress’s powers, 
which additional provisions of the PPACA should be considered non-severable 
from the individual mandate and thus fall with it.   
 The district court below concluded that it was impossible to sever the 
individual mandate from the PPACA, and it therefore struck down the entire Act 
upon finding the mandate unconstitutional.  Record Excerpts (RE) 2074-75.  That 
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court correctly emphasized the centrality of the mandate to the PPACA, concluded 
that the mandate was essential to the operation of the PPACA’s health insurance 
market reforms, and determined that those reforms could not survive without the 
mandate.  RE 2072-74.  That court further reasoned that the PPACA’s health 
insurance reforms comprise the core of the Act, and that any effort to engage in a 
line-by-line analysis of the 2,700 page Act to identify discrete provisions that 
should remain standing independently of the mandate would amount to a judicial 
reconstruction of the Act.  RE 2074-75.  Therefore, that court struck down the 
entirety of the Act, reasoning that any effort to implement health care reform 
absent the individual mandate is a task best left to Congress.  RE 2075. 
 If this Court agrees with the district court that the individual mandate is 
unconstitutional, the Court will then need to consider whether, as the district court 
determined, invalidation of the mandate requires setting aside the PPACA in its 
entirety.  If the Court disagrees with the district court’s severability analysis, the 
prudent course is to remand to the district court for close scrutiny of the PPACA 
provisions to assess which of the remaining provisions Congress would have 
enacted in the absence of the individual mandate.  Such an assessment would 
require examining whether the remaining provisions and insurance reform 
requirements would function as intended without the individual mandate.  
Applying those standards here, this Court must conclude that, at a minimum, the 
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health insurance reform provisions in the PPACA are non-severable from the 
individual mandate and would necessarily fall with it.  If the PPACA’s remaining 
insurance reform provisions were left standing in the absence of the mandate, 
individuals and employers who sponsor health insurance coverage for their 
employees would surely encounter significant market disruption.  Health care costs 
would rise and fewer individuals would obtain coverage—precisely the opposite of 
Congress’s intentions.   
 For instance, the United States has explained that two of the principal health 
insurance reforms enacted by the PPACA—the guaranteed-issue and community-
rating reforms—would necessarily fall with the minimum coverage mandate.   See 
U.S. Br. at 59; RE 1765 (“As defendants have made clear . . . the guaranteed issue 
and community insurance industry reforms in Section 1201 will stand or fall with 
the minimum coverage mandate.”).  In the absence of the mandate, individuals 
would be encouraged to forgo purchasing insurance until they become sick, 
thereby causing an increase in insurance premiums for the remaining consumers.  
The increase in premiums would in turn cause healthy individuals to relinquish (or 
refrain from obtaining) health insurance, causing premiums to rise still further.  
This “premium spiral” has been experienced in various states that have enacted 
similar health insurance reforms without an accompanying minimum coverage 
mandate (such as New York, Kentucky, and Washington).  The legislative record 
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confirms that Congress understood this dynamic and would not have enacted 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms in the absence of the individual 
mandate. 
 But the severability inquiry does not—and cannot—end with the guaranteed-
issue and community-rating reforms alone.  Rather, other insurance reforms in the 
PPACA, beyond guaranteed-issue and community-rating, are also dependent on 
the individual mandate.  As one example, the Act’s risk adjustment mechanism 
would not function properly without the individual mandate and the associated 
community-rating and guaranteed-issue reforms.  PPACA § 1343, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18063.  Risk adjustment provisions are necessary to counterbalance the incentive  
created by guaranteed issue and community rating for insurers to seek out healthy 
subscribers, in lieu of unhealthy subscribers.  This incentive exists because 
guaranteed issue and community rating prevent insurers from underwriting and 
pricing products based on the risk presented.  The PPACA’s risk adjustment 
mechanism counteracts those incentives by reallocating premium revenues among 
insurers so that each insurer receives an amount proportional to its actual risk 
exposure.  But if the mandate, guaranteed-issue, and community-rating provisions 
were invalidated and the risk adjustment mechanism remained, gross inefficiencies 
in the health insurance markets would exist, allowing insurers to pass off to others 
the consequences of flawed underwriting and poor management of health care 
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costs.  This would lead to an increase in health insurance costs, undermining one of 
the primary aims of the PPACA. 
 Amicus does not purport to catalog here the full complement of provisions in 
the Act that should be deemed non-severable from the individual mandate.  
Instead, the principal purpose of this brief is to demonstrate that basic severability 
principles would dictate that many provisions of the Act are non-severable from 
the individual mandate.  If this Court is not inclined to invalidate the Act in its 
entirety, the prudent course would be to remand the case to the district court with 
instructions to conduct further analysis on this issue.  A remand would enable the 
district court to supplement the record and obtain additional briefing and evidence 
on the interrelationship of the minimum coverage mandate and the health insurance 
reform provisions in the PPACA. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. IF THE MINIMUM COVERAGE MANDATE IS HELD TO EXCEED 
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, HEALTH INSURANCE 
REFORM PROVISIONS IN THE PPACA SHOULD ALSO BE 
INVALIDATED AS NON-SEVERABLE FROM THE MANDATE 
 
 A.  Applying Severability Analysis to the PPACA 
 As the Supreme Court has explained, when a court strikes down a particular 
statutory provision on the grounds that it exceeds Congress’s constitutional 
powers, the remaining provisions in the act will remain standing “[u]nless it is 
evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are 
within its power, independently of that which is not.”  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quotation marks omitted); see also Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010).  In 
short, the question is whether Congress would have enacted the remaining 
provisions in the absence of the invalid one.  See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 
(“The final test” for severability holds that “the unconstitutional provision must be 
severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would 
not have enacted.”).  That overarching question turns on an assessment of whether 
the remaining provisions “will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress” in the absence of the invalidated provision.  Id. 
Congress can “ease[]” the inquiry by enacting a severability clause that 
expressly dictates that if any provision is invalidated, it should be considered 
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severable from the remainder of the statute.  Id. at 686.  In that case, there is a 
“presumption” that the “objectionable provision can be excised from the remainder 
of the statute,” leaving the remaining provisions intact.  Id.  This presumption does 
not apply to the PPACA, however, because Congress chose not to include a 
severability clause in the Act.  Indeed, Congress considered one version of the 
legislation that would ultimately become the PPACA that contained a severability 
clause.  See H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 255 (as passed by House, Nov. 7, 2009) (“If 
any provision of this Act … is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the 
provisions of this Act … shall not be affected.”).  Congress elected to pass the bill 
without a severability clause.   
Thus far, two district courts have found the mandate unconstitutional and 
have applied severability analysis to the PPACA, reaching divergent conclusions.  
In Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), the court effectively 
bypassed the required severability analysis after observing that, “without the 
benefit of extensive expert testimony and significant supplementation of the 
record, this Court cannot determine what, if any, portion of the bill would not be 
able to survive independently.”  Id. at 789.  Rather than supplement the record and 
hear expert testimony, however, the court mechanically and without explanation 
ruled that other PPACA provisions were non-severable from the mandate only if 
they explicitly cross-reference the mandate.  Id. at 790.  That unprecedented and 
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formalistic approach to severability implicates an arbitrary handful of the PPACA 
provisions without regard to the basic question of which provisions Congress 
would have enacted in the absence of the mandate.2  Indeed, that approach would 
even leave intact the PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-4, which the United States has rightly explained could not 
survive without the mandate but do not explicitly cross-reference it. 
 The district court below, by contrast, correctly emphasized Congress’s 
findings that the individual mandate is essential to the guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating provisions.  RE 2071-72.  The court concluded that those 
provisions of the Act, as the United States has recognized, could not survive 
without the mandate.  RE 2071-72.  As the court explained, “the individual 
mandate is indisputably necessary to the Act’s insurance market reforms, which 
are, in turn, indisputably necessary to the purpose of the Act.”  RE 2072.  For that 
reason—and because the PPACA lacks a severability clause—the Court struck 
down the Act in its entirety as non-severable from the mandate.  RE 2075.  Any 
other conclusion, the court explained, would call for a line-by-line, judicial 
                                                 
 2 The court made no effort to identify which provisions of the PPACA—if 
any—specifically reference the mandate.  Thirteen statutory provisions include one 
or more references to 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, the provision codifying the mandate.  
See PPACA §§ 1001, 1251, 1302, 1311, 1312, 1331, 1332, 1401, 1411, 1512, 
1514, 9001, and 9014.     
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rewriting of a complex and interwoven congressional enactment, a quasi-
legislative function best left to Congress in the first instance.  RE 2075.   
 The district court’s approach allows Congress, rather than the courts in the 
first instance, to decide what elements of the PPACA should remain the law of the 
land absent the mandate.  However, if this Court were to disagree with this 
approach and decline to invalidate the PPACA in its entirety, applicable 
severability principles at least would require careful examination of the 
interrelationship between the mandate and the PPACA’s health insurance reforms.   
In particular, there are compelling reasons for recognizing the non-severability of 
health insurance reform provisions beyond those that the United States has 
expressly identified as non-severable from the mandate—the guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating provisions.   
 Amicus does not attempt in this brief to compile an exhaustive catalog of the 
particular PPACA health insurance reforms that must fall with the mandate under 
an appropriate severability analysis.  Instead, it first explains why the community-
rating and guaranteed-issue reforms are non-severable from the mandate, and 
further illustrates why the list of non-severable provisions cannot end there.  An 
examination of several health insurance reforms in the PPACA illustrates the 
interconnection between the individual mandate and various PPACA provisions. 
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B. A Proper Approach to Severability Compels the Conclusion that the 
PPACA’s Guaranteed-Issue and Community-Rating Provisions Are 
Non-Severable from the Individual Mandate 
 
 In this case and in related litigation, the United States has explained that the 
PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions cannot survive 
without the individual mandate.  RE 1765 (“Because Congress would not have 
intended this result, these reforms cannot be severed from the minimum coverage 
provision.”).   Those reforms prohibit denying coverage or raising premiums based 
on preexisting conditions, and in the absence of the mandate, they would not 
“function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.”  Alaska Airlines, 
480 U.S. at 685.  Congress explained the interrelationship between those reforms 
and the mandate in the express terms of the Act:  
[I]f there were no [minimum coverage] requirement, many individuals 
would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care.  By 
significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, 
together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this 
adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include 
healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.  The 
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets 
in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue 
and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.  
 
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  In light of Congress’s own 
explanation of its intent, the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions 
plainly should be deemed non-severable from the mandate. 
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 The PPACA’s guaranteed-issue provisions bar health insurers from denying 
coverage based on a subscriber’s preexisting conditions or medical history.  See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not establish rules for 
eligibility (including continued eligibility) of any individual to enroll under the 
terms of the plan or coverage based on any of the following health status-related 
factors….”).  The PPACA’s community-rating provisions prescribe that insurers 
may not charge higher premiums based on preexisting conditions and certain other 
factors.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1).  Those provisions thus preclude health 
insurers from raising premiums based on any condition other than age, geography, 
and tobacco use.  The provisions also establish limits on the extent of permissible 
variations in premiums based on those three factors.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg(a)(1)(A)(ii) – (iv).3   
 Congress understood that, in the absence of the individual mandate, the 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions would disrupt the health 
insurance market due to adverse selection.  If health insurance companies may not 
adjust premiums or deny coverage based on preexisting conditions, healthy 
individuals would have little incentive to obtain insurance until they become sick 
                                                 
 3 Both the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions are found in 
Title I, Section 1201 of the PPACA.  PPACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300gg – 300gg-7.  
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and need coverage, because they know full well that they will be able to obtain 
insurance at the same price at such a time.  Therefore, healthy persons would opt 
out of the insurance market, which would leave health insurers little choice but to 
raise premiums to account for the diminished health (on average) of their 
subscribers.  This increase in premiums will cause more healthy individuals to 
forgo health insurance, further increasing premiums, and so on.  As the United 
States has starkly explained, “[a]bsent a minimum coverage provision, the 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms in Section 1201 would incentivize 
many to drop coverage, leading to a spiral of increased premiums and a shrinking 
risk pool—the insurance market will ‘implode.’”  RE 1765; see also Making 
Health Care Work for American Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 2009), 
available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090317/ 
testimony_reinhardt.pdf (testimony of Prof. Uwe E. Reinhardt) (“It is well known 
that community-rating and guaranteed issue, coupled with voluntary insurance, 
tends to lead to a death spiral of individual insurance.”).4 
                                                 
 4 Experts in the health care field share the view that the individual mandate 
is essential to the intended operation of the PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating provisions.  See, e.g., Bradley Herring, An Economic 
Perspective on the Individual Mandate’s Severability from the PPACA, 364 New 
Eng. J. Med. 16e (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10. 
1056/NEJMpv1101519?ssource=hcrc (“Although they are politically popular, 
these community-rating and guaranteed-issue provisions can reduce the stability of 
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 Congress’s concerns about an “implosion” of the health insurance market 
are reinforced by the experience that various states have had when implementing 
comparable community-rating and guaranteed-issue provisions without an 
individual mandate.  Seven states have enacted guaranteed-issue laws without an 
accompanying mandate.  Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-060(2)(A) (1994) 
(repealed); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 2736-C(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 420-G:6 
(1994); N.J. Stat. § 17B:27A-22; N.Y. Ins. L. §§ 3231, 3232; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 
4080B(d)(1); Wash. Code § 48.43.012(1).  Studies in those states reveal precisely 
the type of adverse selection problems that Congress sought to avoid in the 
PPACA.  See Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. 
Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 71, 97 (2000) (“Following reform, the overall percentage of 
the population with insurance has worsened….”); Roberta B. Meyer, Justification 
for Permitting Life Insurers to Continue to Underwrite on the Basis of Genetic 
Information and Genetic Test Results, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1271, 1291 (1993) 
                                                                                                                                                             
private health insurance markets.…  The primary purpose of the individual 
mandate is to mitigate this adverse selection….”); Anthony T. Lasso, National 
Institute for Health Care Management Foundation, Community Rating and 
Guaranteed Issue in the Individual Health Insurance Market, at 2 (Jan. 2011), 
available at http://nihcm.org/pdf/EV-LoSassoFINAL.pdf (stressing the “distortions 
that can result from community rating and guaranteed issue regulations in the non-
group market when there are no provisions in place to keep people enrolled in 
coverage”); Jonathan Gruber, Center for American Progress, Why We Need the 
Individual Mandate, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.americanprogress 
.org /issues/ 2010/04/pdf/individual_mandate.pdf (“Without the individual 
mandate, the entire structure of reform would fail.”). 
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(New York’s community rating requirement “has led to an increase in rates for 
young, healthy insureds” and “many of them have dropped their health insurance 
coverage”).  Indeed, the Kentucky market reforms were repealed because they 
destabilized the health insurance market.  Cf. Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: 
Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky and 
Massachusetts, 25 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 133, 151 (2000) (“The Kentucky 
reform experience has become notorious for the mass exit of insurers from its 
market.”). 
 For those reasons, there is no basis to doubt Congress’s express 
understanding that the individual mandate is “essential” to the proper functioning 
of a health insurance market that includes the PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating provisions.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  The mandate and those 
reforms are a tightly interwoven group, which presumably stands or falls together.  
Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 315-16 (1936) (“These two sets of 
requirements are not like a collection of bricks, some of which may be taken away 
without disturbing the others, but rather are like the interwoven threads 
constituting the warp and woof of a fabric, one set of which cannot be removed 
without fatal consequences to the whole.”).   
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C. Health Insurance Reforms Beyond the Guaranteed-Issue and Community-
Rating Provisions Are Similarly Intertwined With the Individual Mandate 
for Severability Purposes 
 
 While explaining that the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions 
would necessarily fall if the individual mandate were to be invalidated, the United 
States thus far has deferred any comprehensive effort to identify or assess which 
additional provisions in the PPACA it would deem non-severable from the 
mandate.  U.S. Br. 55-60.  If this Court disagrees with the district court below and 
declines to invalidate the PPACA in its entirety, there are compelling reasons for 
recognizing the non-severability of other health insurance reform provisions.   
 1.  The PPACA’s risk-adjustment provision 
 The risk adjustment provision in Section 1343 of the PPACA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18063, would not function as Congress intended without the individual mandate 
and its associated guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.  Under a 
community-rating system, health plans generally obtain the same premium per 
subscriber, regardless of a subscriber’s health status, gender, or other demographic 
factors.  Health plans with healthier members may receive a windfall because they 
earn an identical premium (per subscriber) to plans that must pay more in claims.  
See Robert Kuttner, The Risk-Adjustment Debate, 339 New Eng. J. Med. 1952, 
1952 (Dec. 24, 1998) (“If plans receive the same unadjusted premium for each 
subscriber, then the plan with healthier members reaps an unearned windfall.”).  
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This system rewards so-called “cream skimming,” i.e., efforts to attract healthier 
subscribers and discourage riskier individuals, instead of rewarding the provision 
of quality service.  Id. at 1952.   
 The PPACA’s risk adjustment provision in Section 1343 counteracts those 
incentives by reallocating premiums in a manner proportional to the actuarial risk 
of each health insurer’s subscribers.  Under the risk adjustment provision, states 
must levy a charge on insurers whose level of actuarial risk falls below the 
statewide average.  42 U.S.C. § 18063.  States then transfer those funds to health 
insurers carrying an actuarial risk exceeding the statewide average.  By aligning 
premium revenues with actuarial risk, the risk-adjustment mechanism diminishes 
the incentive to target healthier populations.  See General Accounting Office, 
Health Care Reform: Considerations for Risk Adjustment under Community 
Rating, GAO/HEHS 94-173, at 1 (Sept. 22, 1994), available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152795.pdf (risk adjustment is meant to “reduce the 
undesirable effects of community rating on insurers’ incentives”). 
 If the individual mandate and the associated community-rating reforms were 
invalidated, the risk-adjustment provision would not function as Congress 
intended.  Without community rating, health insurers would apply traditional 
underwriting principles, varying premium rates based on health risk and other 
relevant factors.  In such market conditions, a health insurer’s premiums should 
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already reflect the actuarial risk of its subscribers.  Thus, imposing a risk-
adjustment mechanism under these market conditions would transfer premium 
dollars from health insurers, who accurately assessed the actuarial risk of their 
subscribers, to other insurers who misjudged their risk pools.  In fact, it could 
create a disincentive for insurers to appropriately manage health care costs; 
instead, insurers may choose to forgo expending resources to appropriately manage 
health care costs, relying instead on the risk adjustment mechanism to recoup any 
losses they may have sustained.  That, in turn, would create gross inefficiencies 
unintended by Congress and contrary to one of the central aims of the PPACA:  
promoting affordable health care.  The risk-adjustment provision in Section 1343 
thus is non-severable from the individual mandate and community-rating reforms. 
2.  The PPACA’s bar on annual limits for benefits 
 
 Section 1001 of the PPACA severely restricts, and eventually prohibits, 
health insurers from imposing annual limits on the benefits paid to subscribers.  
PPACA § 1001; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11.  These restrictions currently dictate that 
annual limits may not be less than $750,000 per person.  Interim Final Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 37,188-01 (June 28, 2010).  That floor increases to $1.25 million per 
person in September, 2011, to $2 million per person in September, 2012, and plans 
with annual limits will be phased out entirely by 2014.  Id.  This reform provision 
will eliminate plans with low annual limits, including so called “mini-med” or 
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“limited benefit” plans, often the most affordable plans for individuals with limited 
income. 
 This prohibition against annual limits only functions as intended when 
considered alongside the individual mandate and guaranteed-issue reforms.  As 
previously noted, the primary purpose of the individual mandate is to avoid the 
potential premium spiral of continually deteriorating risk pools and escalating 
premiums.  Congress appreciated that the mandate was critical to minimizing 
“adverse selection and broaden[ing] the health insurance risk pool to include 
healthy individuals … [in order to] lower health insurance premiums.”  PPACA 
§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  But if the bar on annual limits were 
enforced in the absence of the individual mandate and guaranteed-issue reforms, it 
would eliminate one of the most affordable health insurance options for lower 
income individuals and thereby expand the pool of uninsured individuals contrary 
to Congress’s intent.   
 While the PPACA’s restrictions on low annual limits have technically 
already taken effect, the Department of Health and Human Services has liberally 
granted waivers to enable low-cost plans to continue operating until the mandate 
and guaranteed-issue provisions become effective.  See Hearing of the Oversight & 
Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Energy & Commerce Comm. (Feb. 16, 2011) 
(testimony of Steven Larsen) (“[I]n establishing the waiver process … we did want 
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to make sure that people who have that coverage … can continue that coverage”).  
To date, the Department has granted approximately one thousand waivers to plans 
with annual limits below the current $750,000 threshold, exempting them from the 
Act’s annual limit requirements.  See Robert Pear, Four States Get Waivers to 
Carry Out Health Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2011, at A22.  The Department has 
also granted waivers to four states, exempting all plans operating within their 
borders from PPACA’s annual limit requirements.  Id.  The Department’s 
decisions to grant waivers to these plans demonstrate that the regulation of annual 
limits cannot function as intended without the individual mandate and guaranteed-
issue reforms.  
 3.  The PPACA’s Medical Loss Ratio provision 
 The PPACA’s Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) requirement, also contained in 
Section 1001 of the PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18, is another example of a 
provision that is inextricably linked to the individual mandate.  “Medical Loss 
Ratio” refers to the percentage of each premium dollar expended by an insurer on 
the provision of health care to its subscribers, as opposed to other expenses such as 
administrative costs, salaries, advertising, and profits.  The PPACA establishes a 
minimum MLR of eighty percent for individual and small group coverage, and 
eighty-five percent for large group coverage.  PPACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
18. 
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 Congress predicated the MLR provision on the reduction in administrative 
costs that would accompany the individual mandate and guaranteed-issue reforms.  
42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(J) (“By significantly increasing health insurance coverage 
and the size of purchasing pools … [PPACA] will significantly reduce 
administrative costs and lower health insurance premiums.”).  Conversely, absent 
the mandate’s expanded risk pool and community-rating provisions (provisions 
which have the effect of drastically reducing underwriting costs), administrative 
costs are necessarily higher.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18901(a)(2)(J) (pre-PPACA, 
“[a]dministrative costs for private health insurance … are 26 to 30 percent of 
premiums in the current individual and small group markets,” an amount greater 
than the administrative costs contemplated under applicable MLR caps).  
Therefore, the MLR provision assumes the existence of the individual mandate. 
 The MLR provision also works in tandem with the individual mandate 
because the mandate increases the total number of subscribers in the risk pool, 
which in turn facilitates the estimation of costs in any given year.  To function as 
intended, the MLR provision requires health insurers to price their premiums based 
on the expected amount of claims they will have to pay each year.  With a 
sufficiently sizable risk pool, health insurers can make those predictions with a fair 
degree of accuracy.  But if the individual mandate falls, insurers (particularly those 
in locations with smaller risk pools) could be subject to extreme variations in MLR 
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ratios year-over-year, which are only exacerbated by the ability of individuals to 
move in and out of the risk pool on the basis of their current health status (i.e., sick 
people will move in and healthy people will move out).   
 Those fluctuations could be accommodated over time if health insurers were 
permitted to make long-term predictions based on the knowledge that any 
fluctuations in MLR would eventually even out over a number of years.  But the 
PPACA’s MLR requirements prevent health insurers from insulating themselves 
against such fluctuations by requiring plans to refund excess profits in each 
profitable year.5  This prevents insurers from protecting themselves against lean 
years.  In other words, the MLR provision can only function as Congress intended 
if health insurers can accurately predict their costs year by year, and those 
predictions in turn rest on the increased risk pool that the individual mandate 
would produce.   
 Therefore, it is no surprise that a number of states have requested 
exemptions from the MLR requirements in the PPACA until the mandate takes 
effect.  For instance, Kentucky has asked that the MLR requirement remain at 
Kentucky’s present MLR requirement of sixty-five percent for 2011, with five 
                                                 
 5  After the individual mandate takes effect in 2014, any refund owed under 
the MLR provision will be calculated based on the three-year period preceding the 
MLR deficiency, rather than being calculated based only on the prior year.  42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(B)(ii).   
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percent increases each year until it reaches eighty percent in 2014.  Letter from 
Sharon P. Clark, Ky. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen Sebelius (Feb. 16, 2011).  
New Hampshire has requested that the MLR requirement remain at seventy percent 
until 2014 and noted that, without this exemption, “[t]he loss of carriers providing 
individual insurance in New Hampshire will have a destabilizing effect on the 
market.”  Letter from Roger A. Sevigny, N.H. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen 
Sebelius, (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/ 
mlr_adj_req_01062010.pdf.  Maine, Georgia, Florida, Nevada, Louisiana, Iowa, 
and North Dakota have also requested an exemption from the PPACA’s MLR 
requirements and many other states have signaled their intent to do the same in the 
coming months.  See Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Medical Loss Ratio, 
available at http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/index.html; 
Scoreboard, Politico, Apr. 1, 2011, available at http://www.politico.com/politico 
pulse/0411/politicopulse469.html (reporting that six additional states are leaning 
toward filing a request for an exemption). 
 The Department of Health and Human Services has issued one ruling on 
these waiver requests so far, granting Maine an exemption from the Act’s MLR 
requirements and adjusting Maine’s individual health insurance market MLR rate 
to sixty-five percent through 2013.  Letter from Steven B. Larsen to Mila Kofman, 
Me. Superintendent of Ins. (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/ 
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programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/maine/maine_decision_letter_3_8_11.pdf.  The 
ruling that granted Maine’s waiver request explicitly noted that “there is a 
reasonable likelihood” that insurers “would exit the Maine individual market in the 
absence of an adjustment to the 80 percent MLR standard.”  Id. at 16.  This waiver, 
along with those that are sure to be granted in the near future, demonstrates that the 
Act’s MLR provision is predicated on the individual mandate, and cannot function 
as intended without the mandate. 
*      *      *      *      * 
 These examples generally illustrate the need, under settled severability 
principles, to closely examine the interrelationships between the PPACA’s 
individual mandate and the statute’s health insurance reforms.  The examples are 
only illustrative:  experts have identified additional provisions that Congress may 
not have implemented in the absence of the mandate and associated community-
rating and guaranteed-issue reforms.  See Herring, supra, New Eng. J. Med. 
(discussing additional provisions that may not function as intended without the 
mandate).  Congress clearly contemplated the operation of the PPACA’s health 
insurance reforms in conjunction with the individual mandate, not in its absence.6  
RE 2071-75.    
                                                 
6  The PPACA contains a host of health insurance reform provisions beyond those 
discussed in this brief that require close scrutiny to determine if they are severable 
from the mandate.  The “rate review” provision, PPACA § 1003, 42 U.S.C. 
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II. IF THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE INVALIDATION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE BUT DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 
ENTIRE ACT, IT SHOULD REMAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
CONDUCT A PROPER SEVERABILITY ANALYSIS IN THE FIRST 
INSTANCE  
 
 If this Court concludes that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s 
constitutional authority, then it must determine whether to affirm the district 
court’s conclusion that the mandate is so central to the PPACA that the entire 
statute must be invalidated.  In the event that this Court does not invalidate the 
PPACA in its entirety (or the Act’s full package of insurance reforms), the court 
should rely on established severability principles and remand the issue to the 
district court to assess which PPACA provisions should be invalidated as non-
severable from the individual mandate.   
 The scope of severability—if indeed severability is found to be warranted at 
all—would be best determined by the district court after the parties have an 
opportunity to supplement the evidentiary record.  A remand would properly 
enable the district court to expand and supplement the record to facilitate a 
meaningful inquiry into the interrelationship between the mandate and the 
PPACA’s various health insurance reforms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 300gg-94, the health insurance exchanges, PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031, 
and the health insurance provider tax, PPACA § 9010, 26 U.S.C. § 4001, are 
further examples of insurance reforms that were calibrated to function alongside 
the mandate.  While the PPACA’s insurance reforms are primarily located in Title 
I, they are interspersed throughout the Act.     
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 As a general matter, “severability disputes usually turn on fact-intensive 
inquiries best left to the trial court in the first instance.”  Ackerley Commc’ns of 
Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge, 135 F.3d 210, 214−15 (1st Cir. 1998).  As a 
result, even when confronting severability questions of substantially lesser 
complexity than those presented here, the courts of appeals frequently remand to 
allow the district court to conduct the analysis in the first instance.  See 
Chesapeake B&M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md., 58 F.3d 1005, 1012−13 (4th Cir. 
1995) (“[W]e remand to the district court to determine whether and to what extent 
the licensing scheme is severable from the remainder of the Licensing Law.”); see 
also Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1016 
(9th Cir. 2009) (“We remand to allow the district court to determine whether the 
unconstitutional provisions are severable from the remainder.”); Am. Banker’s 
Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because there is a 
possibility that some part of these provisions may survive preemption, we remand 
to the district court.”); Vt. Right of Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 211 F.3d 376, 389 
(2d Cir. 2000) (directing “the district court, on remand, to analyze the issue of 
severability in the first instance”). 
In the event the Court declines to invalidate the entire Act, additional 
considerations compel a remand in this case.  The United States did not fully brief 
severability questions before the district court, but instead took the position that 
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“[w]orking through the complex permutations presented by the issue of 
severability is an effort best undertaken in separate briefing if this case reaches that 
stage.”  RE 1763.  Thus, the United States has yet to fully address its views 
regarding the proper scope of severability if the individual mandate is stricken.  In 
addition, even if the Court were inclined to limit a finding of non-severability to 
those provisions that the United States has itself acknowledged must fall (i.e., the 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms), it is not clear which precise 
statutory provisions would be stricken.  There is no single provision of the Act that 
embodies all of the guaranteed-issue reforms, nor is there a single provision that 
constitutes the community-rating reforms.  Rather, elements of these reforms are 
contained within multiple statutory provisions.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-
1−300gg-4.  Therefore, even a narrow severability ruling would be difficult to 
implement at the appellate level and would be better suited to the determination of 
a district court on remand after receipt of additional briefing.  Also, as explained 
above, there is a need for a close examination of the other health insurance reforms 
contained in the PPACA.  The district court is better positioned to receive evidence 
and consider full briefing devoted to these issues, along with expert testimony and 
expansion of the record as needed. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
 If this Court determines that the minimum coverage mandate is 
unconstitutional and declines to invalidate the entire Act, it should remand the case 
to the district court to receive evidence and briefing from the parties to determine 
which other health insurance reforms in the PPACA must fall with the mandate. 
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